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INTRODUCTION: FACEBOOK AND THE PREVALENCE OF
SOCIAL MEDIA IN LITIGATION DISCOVERY
When Facebook was first founded in 2004, few could have imagined its quick popularity, pervasive use, and cultural prevalence.
It was perhaps even more difficult to conceive that Facebook,
among other social media networks, would ultimately become a
common and increasingly widespread part of litigation discovery
proceedings. However, courts, counsel, and adversarial parties
quickly realized that, because “an overwhelming majority of adults
online . . . use social networking sites,”1 there is a wealth of information to be found by incorporating social media into traditional
discovery requests. Today, there are over 1.19 billion active Facebook users, and one in five page views in the United States occurs
on Facebook.2 As of 2012, adults had also become the most common users of Facebook, with 29.7% of users age 25 to 34.3 Litigators
have realized that Facebook and other social media sites offer a
“gold mine of potential evidence,” as these sites are “specifically
designed to encourage users to record in writing and share with
others what they are thinking or doing—and even where they are
located—at any given moment.”4
The benefits of social media discovery have become clear, evidenced by the increasing use of social networking in litigation.5 For
example, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers found
that 81% of attorneys who responded to its February 2010 study
reported using evidence found on social networking sites in their
1

Jennifer K. Gregory, #bewareofovershare: Social Media Discovery and Importance in
Intellectual Property Litigation, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 449, 450 (2013)
(citing Maeve Duggan & Joanna Brenner, The Demographics of Social Media Users—2012,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. 2 (2013), available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media/
Files/Reports/2013/PIP_SocialMediaUsers.pdf (asserting that “almost seven out of
ten” adults using the internet use social networking sites).
2
See Dan Noyes, The Top 20 Valuable Facebook Statistics, ZEPHORIA, http://zephoria
.com/social-media/top-15-valuable-facebook-statistics/ (last updated Dec. 31, 2013).
3
See id.
4
Mariel Goetz, Social Media Evidence in Civil Litigation, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. (2013),
available at http://www.ropesgray.com/marielgoetz/~/media/Files/articles/2013/08/
TrialEvidence_ArticleReprint_SocialMediaEvidenceInCivilLitigation.ashx.
5
Id. (“[I]t is becoming standard practice in litigation today to use social media sites to
research parties; to establish or refute facts; to determine or rebut state of mind or health;
and to identify, impeach or bolster the credibility of witnesses.”).
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cases.6 Facebook was found to be the most popular source of evidence, with 66% of attorneys responding indicating that they had
used evidence found on the site.7
Still, the introduction of this new technology has presented a
unique challenge for the courts, “due to [social networking sites’]
relative novelty and their ability to be shared by or with someone
besides the original poster.”8 Furthermore, the varied and changing privacy controls on social media sites like Facebook have raised
questions about the appropriate depth of discovery, as well as the
correct means of such production. Yet, only recently did there begin to be some “push back against efforts to obtain complete access
to an individual’s social networking profile, even those portions
restricted as private.”9
Nearly all social networking sites offer options to allow portions
of a user’s profile to remain “public” while other portions can be
set to remain “private.” The “private” portions of a user’s profile
are typically only accessible to those other users who are “friends”
of the individual user. While it is obvious that any public portions
of an individual’s social media account are available and accessible
to adversarial parties, courts have struggled to create a coherent,
consistent framework for the discoverability of the private content
of a user’s social media account. More specifically, courts have not
consistently answered the question of whether the entire contents
of an individual’s private social media page are discoverable; or,
rather, whether only certain “relevant” portions should be produced. This question becomes intertwined with the issue of how to
best facilitate production of the content of social media sites, as
6

See John G. Browning, Digging for the Digital Dirt: Discovery and Use of Evidence from
Social Media Sites, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 465, 467 (2011) (citing Big Surge in
Social Networking Evidence Says Survey of Nation’s Top Divorce Lawyers, AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.aaml.org/about-theacademy/press/press-releases/e-discovery/big-surge-socialnetworking-evidence-sayssurvey-).
7
See id.
8
Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., No. 3:11-cv-81-RLY-WGH, 2013 WL 3366278, at *2
(S.D. Ind. July 5, 2013).
9
John G. Browning, With “Friends” Like These, Who Needs Enemies? Passwords,
Privacy, and the Discovery of Social Media Content, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 505, 510
(2013).
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certain means of production may inadvertently require broad
access to a user’s private content. This note aims to address and
resolve these issues.
First, in Part I, I will address some of the relevant background
pertaining to social media discovery, and specifically, whether it is
considered to generally be discoverable. Part II will then address
the Stored Communications Act and how it may be applied to social media discovery requests. This will be followed by a discussion
of the standards courts have developed to determine when they
should permit discovery of an individual’s private social media account. In Part II, I discuss the various approaches to determine the
appropriate depth of social media discovery and how courts have
explored different options to prevent “overbroad” discovery requests. Next, in Part III, I address how courts have ruled regarding
the actual facilitation of discovery requests involving an individual’s private social media account. Finally, in Part IV, I aim to resolve questions about how to treat these types of social media discovery requests. Specifically, I make arguments about how courts
should go about ruling on the depth of social media discovery requests and what, if any, determinations such courts should make
about the means of facilitating these discovery requests.
I. IS AN INDIVIDUAL’S PRIVATE SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNT
DISCOVERABLE?
A. Does an Individual Have an Inherent, Protected Privacy Interest in
His or Her Private Social Media Account?
It is well-settled that “[r]elevant information in the private section of [an individual’s] social media account is discoverable.”10
The documents, information and photos contained within such an
account are “not privileged nor protected from production by a
common law right of privacy.”11 Specific attempts have been made
10

Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-1014, 2012 WL 5265170, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 1, 2012) (citing Glazer v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 4374(PGG)
(FM), 2012 WL 1197167, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2012)).
11
Id. (citing Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich.
2012)).
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to argue that the very fact that an individual has chosen to utilize
particular privacy settings should suggest that the private contents
of the individual’s Facebook page are shielded from discovery by
that individual’s protected privacy interest in the content of such
an account.12 These arguments rely on the notion that a protected
privacy interest exists when individuals deliberately choose to (a)
bar access by the general public to their page, and (b) only authorize certain individuals to access their page;13 however, such arguments have been repeatedly rejected by courts.14
As the court noted in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Simply Storage Management, LLC, content from social networking websites “is not shielded from discovery simply because it
is ‘locked’ or private.”15 Although an individual’s privacy concerns
may be relevant in determining whether “requested discovery is
burdensome or oppressive, . . . a person’s expectation and intent
that her communications be maintained as private is not a legitimate basis for shielding those communications from discovery.”16
It therefore becomes irrelevant whether or not an individual believes that he has maintained a “private” Facebook page; for, “information that an individual shares through social networking websites [even while utilizing particular privacy settings,] may be copied and disseminated by another, rendering any expectation of
privacy meaningless.”17 In Patterson v. Turner Construction Co. the
court drew a comparison between private social media pages and a
12

See Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010); EEOC
v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 434 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
13
See id.
14
See, e.g., Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (“[W]hen Plaintiff created her Facebook and
MySpace accounts, she consented to the fact that her personal information would be
shared with others, notwithstanding her privacy settings. Indeed, that is the very nature
and purpose of these social networking sites else they would cease to exist . . . ‘[I]n this
environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in
some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.’”) (citations omitted).
15
Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 434.
16
Id.
17
Beswick v. N. W. Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 07-020592 CACE (03), 2011 WL 7005038
(Trial Order) (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 2011) (citing Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 653 (“[A]s
neither Facebook nor MySpace guarantee complete privacy, Plaintiff has no legitimate
reasonable expectation of privacy.”)); see also Moreno v. Hartford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 858, 862–63 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2009) (finding “no reasonable expectation
of privacy where an individual posted information on MySpace”).

2014]

"SHARING" WITH THE COURT

233

person’s diary, reasoning that in the same way that “relevant matter” from an individual’s diary is discoverable, any relevant material from an individual’s Facebook account is discoverable regardless of the privacy settings utilized by the page’s creator.18
B. Does the Stored Communications Act Apply to Discovery Requests
Made to Individual Social Media Users in Civil Litigation?
1. What is the Stored Communications Act?
The Stored Communications Act (formally titled “Unlawful
access to stored communications” and hereinafter referred to as
the “SCA”) provides, in pertinent part, that whoever:
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication
service is provided; or
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access
that facility;
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized
access to a wire or electronic communication while
it is in electronic storage in such system shall be punished as provided . . . .
....
(c) Exceptions – Subsection (a) of this section does
not apply with respect to conduct authorized –
(1) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service;
(2) by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user . . . 19
The court interpreted the SCA in Glazer v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., finding that the SCA prohibits an entity that provides
an electronic communication service from knowingly divulging “to
any person or entity the contents of a communication while in elec-

18
Patterson v. Turner Const. Co., 931 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (citing
Faragiano v. Town of Concord, 741 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (2002)).
19
18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012).
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tronic storage by that service.”20 Therefore, even in light of a valid
subpoena or court order, the SCA prohibits Facebook (an electronic communication service) from revealing the contents of an individual’s account to any non-governmental entity.21 Facebook is
barred from providing anything more than basic subscriber information.22 However, the Glazer court clarified that an electronic
communication service, like Facebook, may provide the contents of
communication if the electronic communication service is granted
“lawful consent” to do so by the “originator or an intended recipient of [the] communication” in question.23
2. The Stored Communications Act Does Not Apply to
Discovery Requests in Civil Litigation
Parties have made attempts to argue that the SCA fully proscribes Facebook from producing the content of an individual’s
account, and further, that it bars any discovery of such accounts at
all.24 Courts have repeatedly ruled that such propositions are misguided.25 First, the SCA only applies to subpoena requests directed
20

Glazer v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 4374(PGG) (FM), 2012 WL 1197167,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2012) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)); see also Crispin v. Christian
Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 972–73 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
21
See Browning, supra note 6, at 473 (The SCA “prohibits Facebook from disclosing
the contents of a user’s Facebook account to any non-governmental entity even pursuant
to a valid subpoena or court order.”).
22
See id. (“The most Facebook can provide is the basic subscriber information for a
particular account.”).
23
Glazer, 2012 WL 1197167, at *2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)); see also Crispin, 717
F. Supp. 2d at 972–73.
24
See, e.g., Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688 (Pa. Ct. C. P. Nov. 8,
2011) (Trial Order) (defendant claimed that disclosure of her Facebook username and
password may be in violation of the SCA); In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., N.Y., on
Feb. 12, 2009, No. 09-MD-2085, 2011 WL 6370189, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011)
(“Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, disclosure of electronic communications is not
barred by the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, which prohibits
unauthorized access to stored electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). The
SCA does not apply to the user of the electronic communications service himself, nor
does it impose civil or criminal liability when action is taken in good faith pursuant to a
court order.”); Glazer, 2012 WL 1197167, at *2 (Plaintiff asserted that the SCA
“proscribe[d] any effort to have [an electronic communication service or a remote
computing service] produce transcripts of [the plaintiff’s] chats.” The court rejected this
argument. See infra note 29).
25
See Glazer, 2012 WL 1197167.
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specifically at companies like Facebook and is therefore not applicable to discovery requests between adversarial parties in civil litigation.26 The SCA “is not a catch-all statute designed to protect
the privacy of stored Internet communications. Rather it only applies to the enumerated entities. [If an individual party is not an
electronic communication service or a remote computing service],
the SCA does not protect her Facebook profile from discovery.”27
Second, the SCA allows for an individual to sign a release form
permitting Facebook to provide a party with the content of an individual’s private account.28 In such a case, the court may also direct
or require an individual to sign such a release form.29
26

See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 975–76 (citing Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.,
253 F.R.D. 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, L.L.C., 550
F. Supp. 2d 606, 611 (E.D. Va. 2008); O’Grady v. Super. Ct., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423
(2006)) (holding that civil subpoenas are not permissible under the SCA, and the
defendant may not directly request information from Facebook); see also Levine v.
Culligan of Fla., Inc., No. 50-2011-CA-010339-XXXXMB, 2013 WL 1100404 (Trial
Order) (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 29, 2013) (“[C]ourts seem to be in agreement that the [SCA]
prohibits records from being subpoenaed directly from Facebook and other social
networking sites.”) (citations omitted).
27
Largent, 2011 WL 5632688.
28
See Glazer, 2012 WL 1197167, at *2 (Electronic communication services and remote
computer services may “divulge the contents of a communication with the ‘lawful
consent’ of the originator or an intended recipient of that communication.”) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3)).
29
See id. (“The Court need not determine whether Glazer’s communications are
electronically stored, or whether Glazer consented to the disclosure of her LivePerson
chats by agreeing to the Terms and Conditions, because it may simply direct that she
consent to disclosure if the chats are likely to contain information relevant to this case.
See, e.g., In re Air Crash near Clarence Ctr., N.Y., on Feb. 12, 2009, Nos. 09-MD-2085,
09-CV-961 S, 2011 WL 6370189, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011) (directing plaintiff to
produce relevant electronic communications, including “social media accounts, emails,
text messages, and instant messages,” and noting that the defendant may request written
authorizations to obtain such communications from third parties if the plaintiff’s
production is insufficient); EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 434
(S.D. Ind. 2010) (Content from social networking websites “is not shielded from
discovery simply because it is ‘locked’ or ‘private.’ Although privacy concerns may be
germane to the question of whether requested discovery is burdensome or oppressive and
whether it has been sought for a proper purpose in the litigation, a person’s expectation
and intent that her communications be maintained as private is not a legitimate basis for
shielding those communications from discovery.”); Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907
N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (requiring personal injury plaintiff to give
defendant a properly-executed consent and authorization for her “Facebook and
MySpace records, including any records previously deleted or archived by said
operators.”).
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C. What is Required for a Court to Allow the Discovery of an
Individual’s Private Social Media Account?
Courts have generally agreed that, in order to permit the discovery of an individual’s private social media account, the requesting party must demonstrate that some threshold of “relevance”
exists.30 Generally, this “relevance” is demonstrated by providing
proof that the information available in an individual’s public Facebook profile is relevant to the litigation.31 Often, this means that the
requesting party has provided examples of information contained in
the individual’s public Facebook profile that directly contradicts
that individual’s claims or specifically relates to the claims in question in the pending litigation.32 In Fawcett v. Altieri, the court sum30

See Potts v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 11-CV-1180, 2013 WL 1176504, at *3 (M.D.
Ten. Mar. 20, 2013); Keller v. Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Casualty Co., No. CV 12-72M-DLC-JCL, 2013 WL 27731, at *4 (D. Mont. Jan. 2, 2013); Tompkins v. Detroit Metro.
Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 655. Contra
Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112, 114 n.1
(E.D.N.Y. 2013). The court disagreed with this approach, stating:
[Th]is approach can lead to results that are both too broad and too
narrow. On the one hand, a plaintiff should not be required to turn
over the private section of his or her Facebook profile (which may or
may not contain relevant information) merely because the public
section undermines the plaintiff’s claims. On the other hand, a
plaintiff should be required to review the private section and produce
any relevant information, regardless of what is reflected in the public
section. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a party
to prove the existence of relevant material before requesting it.
Furthermore, this approach improperly shields from discovery the
information of Facebook users who do not share any information
publicly.
Id.
31
See Brogan v. Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, L.L.P., No. 08 CV 6048, 2013 WL
1742689 (Trial Order) (Pa. Ct. C. P. Apr. 22, 2013) (“[A] party may obtain discovery of
private Facebook posts, photographs and communications only if the electronically stored
information is relevant, and the party may satisfy that relevancy requirement by showing
that publicly accessible information posted on the user’s Facebook page controverts or
challenges the user’s claims or defenses in the pending litigation.”).
32
See, e.g., Loporcaro v. City of N.Y., 950 N.Y.S.2d 723, at *5, *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012)
(“[P]laintiffs argue that the moving defendant has not provided a sufficient factual
predicate to obtain access to the non-public contents of plaintiff’s ‘FACEBOOK’
account . . . Since it appears that plaintiff has voluntarily posted at least some information
about himself on Facebook which may contradict the claims made by him in the present
action, he cannot claim that these postings are now somehow privileged or immune from
discovery. Therefore, granting [the defendant] access to portions of plaintiff’s Facebook
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marized this concept of relevance, stating that “[t]he party requesting the discovery of an adversary’s restricted social media accounts should first demonstrate a good faith basis to make the request.”33 In the federal context, relevancy is defined under Rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and is to be “construed
broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably
could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or
may be in th[e] case.”34
The court found that the defendant in Zimmerman v. Weis Markets, Inc. made this necessary demonstration.35 Zimmerman sought
damages for injuries to his leg resulting from an accident that occurred while he was operating a forklift at the Weis Markets’ warehouse. Specifically, Zimmerman complained that “‘his health in
general [had] been seriously and permanently impaired and compromised,’ and that ‘he [had] sustained a permanent diminution in
the ability to enjoy life and life’s pleasures.’”36 However, upon review of Zimmerman’s public Facebook profile, the defendants
account, including access to certain deleted materials, may well prove relevant and
necessary to the defense.”) (citing generally Patterson v. Turner Const. Co., 931
N.Y.S.2d 311 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); Romano, 907 N.Y.S. 2d at 650).
33
Fawcett v. Altieri, 960 N.Y.S.2d 592, 597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013).
34
Giacchetto, 293 F.R.D. at 113 (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S.
340, 351 (1978)) (citing Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 882 F.2d 682, 687 (2d
Cir. 1989) (holding that “the broad scope of discovery delimited by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is designed to achieve disclosure of all the evidence relevant to the merits
of a controversy.”); Barrett v. City of N.Y., 237 F.R.D. 39, 40 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting
that the information sought “need not be admissible at trial to be discoverable”); Brown
v. City of N.Y., No. CV 2008–5095(FB)(MDG), 2011 WL 4594276, *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 2011) (stating, “when broader discovery is sought by the parties, the Court should
determine the scope according to the reasonable needs of the action”)).
35
Zimmerman v. Weis Mkts., Inc., No. 09-1535, 2011 WL 2065410 (Pa. Ct. C. P. May
19, 2011) (Trial Order) (“It is well recognized that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure, like New York, provide for liberal discovery: ‘Generally, discovery is liberally
allowed with respect to any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the cause being
tried. Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1.’ Zimmerman placed his physical condition in issue, and Weis
Markets is entitled to discovery thereon. Based on a review of the publicly accessible
portions of his Facebook and MySpace accounts, there is a reasonable likelihood of
additional relevant and material information on the non-public portions of these sites.
Zimmerman voluntarily posted all of the pictures and information on his Facebook and
MySpace sites to share with other users of these social network sites, and he cannot now
claim he possesses any reasonable expectation of privacy to prevent Weis Markets from
access to such information.”) (citations omitted).
36
Id. (citing Complaint, ¶ 25(b), (e) and (f)).
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found that Zimmerman’s interests included “‘ridin’ and ‘bike
stunts.’”37 A review of Zimmerman’s public MySpace profile also
revealed photos of Zimmerman with his motorcycle before and after an accident, as well as a photo of Zimmerman in shorts, where
the scar from his accident at Weis Markets was clearly visible.38
This contradicted Zimmerman’s deposition testimony, which
stated that he did not wear shorts because he was too embarrassed
by the scar on his leg.39 Adopting the rationale of the opinion in
McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc.,40 the Zimmerman court
found that Weis Markets had provided more than the required
“good faith basis”41 to permit discovery of Zimmerman’s private
Facebook and MySpace accounts.42
The court reached an analogous decision in Richards v. Hertz
Corp., finding that “[the defendants] made a showing that at least
some of the discovery sought [would] result in the disclosure of
relevant evidence or is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information bearing on [the plaintiff’s] claim.”43 In Richards,
multiple plaintiffs sought to recover damages for personal injuries
resulting from an automobile accident.44 One plaintiff, McCarthy,
testified at a deposition that her injuries from the accident “impaired her ability to play sports, and caused her to suffer pain that
was exacerbated in cold weather.”45 The defendants conducted a
37

Id.
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at n.4 (“As set forth in McMillen: ‘Where there is an indication that a person’s
social network sites contain information relevant to the prosecution or defense of a
lawsuit, therefore, and given Koken’s [Koken v. One Beacon Ins. Co., 911 A.2d 1021 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2006)] admonition that the courts should allow litigants to utilize ‘all rational
means for ascertaining the truth,’ 911 A.2d at 1027, and the law’s general dispreference
for the allowance of privileges, access to those sites should be freely granted.’”) (quoting
McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285 (Pa. Ct.
C. P. Sept. 9, 2010) (Trial Order)).
41
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
42
See Zimmerman, 2011 WL 2065410 (“Based on a review of the publicly accessible
portions of his Facebook and MySpace accounts, there is a reasonable likelihood of
additional relevant and material information on the non-public portions of these sites.”).
43
Richards v. Hertz Corp., 953 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (citing
Patterson v. Turner Const. Co., 931 N.Y.S.2d 311 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
44
Id.
45
Id.
38
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search of the portions of McCarthy’s Facebook profile that were
not blocked by privacy settings and found photographs of McCarthy skiing in the snow, dated six months after her deposition.46 Accordingly, the court held that the defendants “demonstrated that
McCarthy’s Facebook profile contained a photograph that was
probative of the issue of the extent of her alleged injuries, and it is
reasonable to believe that other portions of her Facebook profile
may contain further evidence relevant to that issue.”47
However, in Tompkins v. Detroit Metropolitan Airport, the court
characterized the defendant’s discovery request as a “proverbial
fishing expedition” and declined to find such requisite relevance.48
Tompkins was a slip-and-fall case, in which the plaintiff claimed
that as a result of injuries sustained at the Detroit Metropolitan
Airport she was “impaired in her ability to work and enjoy life.”49
The defendants attempted to show that the plaintiff’s public Facebook postings demonstrated the relevance of the plaintiff’s private
Facebook postings.50 The court rejected this argument, noting that:
The public postings . . . are photographs showing
the Plaintiff holding a very small dog and smiling,
and standing with two other people at a birthday
party in Florida . . . . [T]hese pictures are not inconsistent with Plaintiffs claim of injury or with the
medical information she has provided. She does not
claim that she is bed-ridden, or that she is incapable
of leaving her house or participating in modest social activities. The dog in the photograph appears to
weigh no more than five pounds and could be lifted
with minimal effort.51

46

Id.
Id.
48
Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
(“[T]he Defendant does not have a generalized right to rummage at will through
information that Plaintiff has limited from public view. Rather, consistent with Rule
26(b) . . . there must be a threshold showing that the request information is reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”).
49
Id. at 387.
50
Id. at 388.
51
Id. at 388–89.
47
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II. WHAT OPTIONS HAVE COURTS EXPLORED TO PREVENT
“OVERBROAD” DISCOVERY REQUESTS? WHEN DOES A
REQUEST BECOME “OVERBROAD”?
A. Complete, or Near-Complete, Discovery of an Individual’s Private
Social Media Account
Even after successfully convincing a judge that the necessary
“relevance” exists to compel production of an individual’s private
social media account, parties are still faced with arguing the appropriate depth of such discovery. Courts have taken varied approaches to this issue, typically framing their inquiry to best prevent
“overbroad” discovery. In Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, the court articulated at least one circumstance in which it was clear that a discovery request of an individual’s private social media account was
overbroad.52 In response to the defendant’s request for the plaintiff’s username and password, the court reasoned that such access
would provide defendant with “all the information in the private
sections of [the plaintiff’s] social media accounts—relevant and
irrelevant alike.”53 The court compared the request to a request for
all of the information in a file cabinet, finding that “[t]he fact that
the information defendants seek is in an electronic file as opposed
to a file cabinet does not give them the right to rummage through
the entire file.”54
Yet, many courts have permitted discovery requests that the
Howell court may have characterized as “overbroad,” allowing for
the complete or near-complete discovery of the entirety of an individual’s private Facebook profile.55 For example, the plaintiff in
52

Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:11-1014, 2012 WL 5265170 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 1,
2012).
53
Id. at *1.
54
Id.
55
See, e.g., Moore v. Miller, No. 10-651, 2013 WL 2456114, at *3 (D. Colo. June 6,
2013) (“Mr. Moore shall produce, under shield of the Court’s standard protective order,
his entire Facebook history, including his Activity Log, from the date of his arrest forward
and continuing to the close of discovery.”); Bass ex rel. Bass v. Miss Porter’s Sch., No.
3:08-1807, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1–2 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2009) (Plaintiff was ordered to
provide a complete production of all Facebook data to the defendant.); Beswick v. N. W.
Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 07-020592 CACE (03), 2011 WL 7005038 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3,
2011) (Trial Order) (Plaintiff was ordered to “identify any internet social media websites
which [he] . . . used and/or maintain[ed] an account in the last five (5) years” and to
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Beswick v. North West Medical Center, Inc. claimed that the defendant’s medical negligence caused permanent brain injuries.56 The
defendant’s discovery request asked the plaintiff to provide (1) any
internet social media website which the plaintiff has used or maintained in the last five years; and (2) the plaintiff’s username and
password, or a copy of all non-privileged content/data shared on
the account in the last five years.57 The Beswick court found first
that, overall, this request was relevant to the claims in question.58
The request also would supply the defendant with the necessary
information to effectively refute the plaintiff’s noneconomic damages claims.59 Finally, the request was “reasonably calculated to
lead to admissible evidence.”60 The court held that “the interrogatories [were] not overbroad as they specifically delineate the information sought. Furthermore, the interrogatories [were] narrow in
scope, as they include a time limitation of five years.”61 The Beswick court’s holding suggested that the defendant’s request “simply asking for” the plaintiff’s username and password was sufficient
to provide the necessary “specificity”62 that the court sought.63
Additionally, the court went so far as to allow discovery of the enti“provide [his] username and password, or, alternatively . . . provide a copy of all nonprivileged content/data shared on the account in the last five (5) years.” Plaintiff was
ordered to provide a privilege log if there was any privilege to assert.); McCann v.
Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 910 N.Y.S.2d 614 (2010); Robinson v. Jones Lang LaSalle
Ams., Inc., No. 3:12-0127, 2012 WL 3763545, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 29, 2012) (Plaintiff was
ordered to produce “(1)any: (a) email or text messages that plaintiff sent to, received
from, or exchanged with any current and former employee of defendant, as well as
messages forwarding such messages; or (b) online social media communications by
plaintiff, including profiles, postings, messages, status updates, wall comments, causes
joined, groups joined, activity streams, applications, blog entries, photographs, or media
clips, as well as third-party online social media communications that place plaintiff’s own
communications in context; (2) from [the date of the incident in question] to the [date of
the order]; (3) that reveal, refer, or relate to: (a) any significant emotion, feeling, or
mental state allegedly caused by defendant’s conduct; or (b) events or communications
that could reasonably be expected to produce a significant emotion, feeling, or mental
state allegedly caused by defendant’s conduct.”).
56
Beswick, 2011 WL 7005038.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
See cases cited supra note 32 and accompanying text.
63
See Browning, supra note 9, at 513.
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rety of the plaintiff’s private Facebook account, reasoning, “the
entire content of the account was ‘clearly relevant.’”64
Similarly, in Bass ex rel. Bass v. Miss Porter’s School, the court
ordered the plaintiff to produce all of the documents contained within her private Facebook account, reasoning that the “relevance of
the content of Plaintiff’s Facebook usage as to both liability and
damages . . . is more in the eye of the beholder than subject to strict
legal demarcations, and production should not be limited to Plaintiff’s own determination of what may be ‘reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’”65 The Bass plaintiff
was a teenager who claimed that Miss Porter’s School (an exclusive private school located in Farmington, Connecticut) had failed
to protect her from the bullying she experienced while attending
the school.66 Bass initiated the suit after she was expelled from
Miss Porter’s due to excessive absences—absences, which Bass
argued, were the result of the emotional distress she suffered because of the bullying.67 Facebook provided Bass with approximately
750 pages of documents that contained the entire contents of Bass’
private Facebook account; however, prior to the court’s order,
Bass had only turned over 100 of these pages to the requesting defendants.68 Bass acknowledged that her claims relied, in part, on
certain Facebook postings and related correspondence from her
time at Miss Porter’s, but she still argued that the documents requested were “irrelevant and immaterial” and therefore should not
be produced in full.69 The court rejected this argument, noting
“Facebook usage depicts a snapshot of the user’s relationships and
state of mind at the time of the content’s posting.”70 In this case it
seemed that the court rejected the notion that the burden is placed
on a responding party to properly, and ethically, determine what
information is responsive to a discovery request. Rather, the court
concluded that this incident seemed to uniquely require that the
64

Id. (emphasis added).
Bass ex rel. Bass v. Miss Porter’s Sch., No. 3:08-1807, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1 (D.
Conn. Oct. 27, 2009) (emphasis added).
66
Id.; see Browning, supra note 6, at 488.
67
Bass, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1; see Browning, supra note 6, at 488.
68
Bass, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1; see Browning, supra note 6, at 488.
69
Bass, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1; see Browning, supra note 6, at 488.
70
Bass, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1; see Browning, supra note 6, at 488.
65

2014]

"SHARING" WITH THE COURT

243

requesting party be able to determine the relevance of requested materials themselves.
The District of Oregon also ordered the production of all content contained within a plaintiff’s social media accounts. Yet, the
court qualified the request somewhat, limiting discovery production to content that revealed, referred, or related to “(a) any significant emotion, feeling, or mental state allegedly caused by defendant’s conduct; or (b) events or communications that could reasonably be expected to produce a significant emotion, feeling, or
mental state allegedly caused by defendant’s conduct.”71 The
plaintiff in this case brought an employment discrimination action
against her employer, claiming race discrimination and retaliation.72 The court’s order ultimately required production of “all [of]
the plaintiff’s social media footprint, including profiles, postings,
messages, status updates, wall comments, causes joined, Likes,
groups joined, activity streams, applications, blog entries, photographs, and media clips, as well as third-party social media communications that placed the plaintiff’s own communications in
context.”73 The court justified its ruling by explaining that it was
“impossible for the court to define the limits of discovery in such
cases with enough precision to satisfy the litigant who is called
upon to make a responsive production.”74 Additionally, the court
chose to treat all forms of electronic communications similarly,
finding “no principled reason” to distinguish between emails, text
messages, or social media platforms.75
In McCann v. Harleysville, the court declined to rule out the
possibility of complete social media disclosure, without fully endorsing the practice. First, the court stated that the defendant’s
initial discovery request was essentially a “fishing expedition” into
the plaintiff’s private Facebook account, as it was not supported by

71

Robinson v. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams., Inc., No. 12-0127, 2012 WL 3763545, *2 (D.
Or. Aug. 29, 2012).
72
Id.
73
Thomas Roe Frazer II, Social Media: From Discovery to Marketing-A Primer for
Lawyers, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 539, 549 (2013).
74
Robinson, 2012 WL 3763545, at *2.
75
Id. at *1.
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a showing of relevance.76 However, the court acknowledged that
the trial court had “abused its discretion in prohibiting defendant
from seeking disclosure of plaintiff’s Facebook account at a future
date.”77
Comparatively, some courts have explicitly stated that full disclosure of an individual’s private social media account is impermissible.78 In Winchell v. Lopiccolo, a plaintiff sought damages resulting from injuries affecting her cognitive function.79 The defendants requested full access to the plaintiff’s Facebook account (requesting authorization to access the plaintiff’s Facebook themselves—resulting in unrestricted access), asserting that the account’s content might shed light on the plaintiff’s “ability to portray cognitive function.”80 Specifically, the defendant’s request
argued that:
The layout of [the plaintiff’s] Facebook page would
demonstrate cognitive function inasmuch as the
layout of a Facebook page calls for creativity of
some sort as well as thought in providing captions
for photographs, narrative posts written by the
plaintiff as well as her ability to write and comment.
Writings on the page would be direct and circumstantial evidence of her claims. Moreover, lucid and
logical writing or a lack thereof, would be useful in
the defense and/or assessment of this case.81
The court acknowledged that in cases that involve allegations
surrounding a plaintiff’s mental capacity, “every bit of information” that was contained within the plaintiff’s Facebook page
would, to some extent, present evidence of some level of cognitive
76

McCann v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 910 N.Y.S.2d, 614, 615 (N.Y. App. Div.
2010).
77
Id.
78
See, e.g., Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 389 (E.D. Mich.
2012) (“[T]he request for the entire account, which may well contain voluminous
personal material having nothing to do with this case, is overly broad.”); Winchell v.
Lopiccolo, 954 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (finding that the “Defendants’
Request for unrestricted access to Plaintiff’s Facebook page [was] overbroad.”).
79
Winchell, 954 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
80
Id. (citations omitted).
81
Id.
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function.82 As a result, the court found that the defendant’s request for unrestricted access to the Plaintiff’s Facebook page was
overbroad, denying discovery as requested.83 The court therefore
essentially concluded that such unrestricted access should always
be deemed overbroad, even in light of acknowledging that the entirety of an individual’s Facebook account would be, in fact, relevant. Although it does seem that, intuitively, requesting the entirety of an individual’s private social media account is likely “overbroad,” the court’s reasoning here appears contradictory. For, if a
judge is willing to conclude that “every bit of information” contained in an individual’s account would be relevant, then the accompanying ruling should permit discovery of all relevant information—no matter how broad—thereby allowing discovery of the entire account.
The court’s opinion in Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union
Free School District further discusses the appropriate depth of discovery in emotional damages cases involving requests for the production of an individual’s private social media accounts. The plaintiff in Giacchetto claimed that the defendant violated the Americans
with Disabilities Act, subjecting the plaintiff to discrimination
based on her diagnosis of adult Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder.84 The defendant moved to compel authorizations for the
release of all social media account records, arguing that “information from Plaintiff’s social networking accounts is relevant to Plaintiff’s claims of physical and emotional damages because it reflects
her ‘levels of social interaction and daily functioning’ and her
‘emotional and psychological state.’”85 The court found that broad
discovery of the plaintiff’s social media account was not permissible merely because the plaintiff’s claims required an inquiry into
the plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress, stating that, “[i]f the
Court were to allow broad discovery of Plaintiff’s social networking
postings as part of the emotional distress inquiry, then there would
82

Id. at 424.
Id. (noting that “[t]he Court is troubled by the breadth of Defendant’s Request for
authorization for Plaintiff’s Facebook page because it seeks unrestricted access.”).
84
Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112, 113
(E.D.N.Y. 2013).
85
Id. at 114 (citations omitted).
83
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be no principled reason to prevent discovery into every other personal communication the Plaintiff had or sent since [the] alleged
incident.”86 Citing Rozell v. Ross-Holst, the court noted that, theoretically, a person’s every action could, to some degree, reflect his
emotional state; but, this could not justify “requiring the production of every thought [an individual] may have reduced to writing
or . . . the deposition of everyone [he or she] might have talked
to.”87
Additionally, the Giacchetto court analyzed the decision in Offenback v. L.M. Bowman, Inc., finding support for different analyses
of social media discovery requests, depending on the nature of the
claims in question.88 Giacchetto notes that, although the plaintiff’s
claims in Offenback involved both physical and psychological damages, after an in camera review of the plaintiff’s Facebook and
MySpace accounts, the Offenback court did not order the production of any content expressing emotion or relating to social activities with friends.89 The Offenback court did, however, compel production of other posts relating to the plaintiff’s alleged physical injuries.90 Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen Tomlinson found this to
suggest that “Offenback underscores an important distinction between the relevance of social networking information to claims for
physical damages and claims for emotional damages.”91 Judge
Tomlinson explained that, while posts exhibiting physical activity
in light of a plaintiff’s claims for physical damages are obviously
relevant, it is more difficult to find such clear cut relevance when
86

Id. at 115.
Id. (citing Rozell v. Ross-Holst, No. 05 Civ. 2936(JGK)JCF, 2006 WL 163143, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006) (motion to compel emails that defendants argued provided a
contemporaneous record of plaintiff’s emotional state”); Kennedy v. Contract Pharmacal
Corp., No. CV 12–2664(JFB)(ETB), 2013 WL 1966219, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2013)
(denying motion to compel “all documents . . . reflecting and/or regarding Plaintiff’s
expression of an emotional feeling while utilizing a social networking site” where there
was no specificity and no attempt to limit the requests to any allegedly relevant acts)).
88
Id. at 115–16 (citing Offenback v. L.M. Bowman, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1789, 2011 WL
2491371 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2011)).
89
Id.
90
Offenback, 2011 WL 2491371, at *2–3 (Plaintiff was compelled to produce all
information deemed “potentially relevant” by the court after an in camera review, which
included comments by the plaintiff and his friends indicating that the plaintiff made long
trips on his motorcycle.)
91
Giacchetto, 293 F.R.D. at 115–16.
87
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analyzing “routine expressions of mood” in the context of an emotional distress claim.92 Ultimately, in light of these considerations,
Giacchetto called for the production of “limited social networking
postings.”93 Here the court took a position similar to that in Winchell; however, the Giacchetto court declined to actually conclude
(as Winchell did) that the entirety of the plaintiff’s private social
media account was relevant. This distinction proves to be important because Giacchetto clarifies the court’s reasons for concluding
that it is perhaps unwise to place too much reliance on what an individual once perceived to be a casual expression of thoughts or
emotions.
B. “Tailored” Requests Permitting Only the Discovery of “Relevant”
Material
The holdings of the aforementioned cases suggest the existence
of an alternative approach to assessing the appropriate depth of
discovery in requests for private social media content. Timothy C.
Quinn argues that private content “should be discoverable only to
a certain extent and under certain circumstances,” and such access
should not be freely granted.94 Furthermore, “at the very least,
[such] discovery requests should be narrowly tailored to seek only
relevant information.”95 John G. Browning similarly asserts that
92

Id. at 116 (“For example, a severely depressed person may have a good day or several
good days and choose to post about those days and avoid posting about moods more
reflective of his or her actual emotional state.”) (citing Kathryn R. Brown, The Risks of
Taking Facebook at Face Value: Why the Psychology of Social Networking Should Influence the
Evidentiary Relevance of Facebook Photographs, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 357, 365
(2012) (“Because social networking websites enable users to craft a desired image to
display to others, social scientists have posited that outside observers can misinterpret
that impression.”)).
93
Id. (Plaintiff was required to produce “any specific references to the emotional
distress she claims she suffered or treatment she received in connection with the
incidents underlying her Amended Complaint (e.g., references to a diagnosable condition
or visits to medical professionals).” Because the plaintiff, “in seeking emotional distress
damages . . . opened the door to discovery into other potential sources/causes of that
distress,” she was also ordered to produce “any postings on social networking websites
that refer to an alternative potential stressor.”). See also Offenback, 2011 WL 2491371, at
*2–3.
94
Timothy C. Quinn, The Discoverability of Private Social Media Content: Are
Pennsylvania Trial Courts Going too Far by Granting Litigants Unfettered Access to Their
Opponents’ Social Media Accounts?, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 787, 806 (2013).
95
Id. (emphasis added).
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practitioners, when drafting social media discovery requests,
should refrain from being excessively broad.96 Instead, he says, requests should be tailored to specify the precise content that is
sought, or should be clearly tied to the claims in question.97 As an
example, Browning provides that, “instead of just a blanket request
for all content, [litigants should] seek ‘all online profiles, postings,
messages (including, but not limited to, tweets, replies, re-tweets,
direct messages, status updates, wall comments, groups joined, activity streams, and blog entries), photographs, videos, and online
communication’ relating to particular claims, allegations of mental
anguish or emotional distress, defenses, et cetera.”98
In Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., Mailhoit brought suit
against her former employer, Home Depot, making claims about
her mental and emotional state.99 The court responded to four discovery requests, three of which were deemed overly broad and
were accordingly denied, and, one of which was granted because
the request was tailored to the specific claims in question.100 The
court granted the defendant’s request for all social networking site
communications “between Plaintiff and any current or former
Home Depot employees, or which in any way refer . . . to her employment at Home Depot or this lawsuit,” explaining that the request was “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”101 Furthermore, the court found that this request was not overly burdensome and was technically practical.102
In contrast, Mailhoit denied the defendant’s request for discovery of:

96

Browning, supra note 6, at 473.
Id. at 474.
98
Id. See also Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., No. 3:11-cv-81-RLY-WGH, 2013 WL
3366278, at *3 (S.D. Ind. July 5, 2013) (“[Defendant] only claims that communications
‘relating to the Plaintiff’s enjoyment of life, ability to engage in outdoor activities, and
employment activities . . . [are] directly relevant.’ The parties do not appear to disagree
about what materials within [Plaintiffs’] Facebook archives would be relevant.” (citing
Defendant’s Reply, ¶ 13)).
99
See Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566, 569 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
100
Id. at 569, 571–73.
101
Id. at 572.
102
See id.
97
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(1) Any profiles, postings or messages (including
status updates, wall comments, causes joined,
groups joined, activity streams, blog entries) from
social networking sites from October 2005 (the approximate date Plaintiff claims she first was discriminated against by Home Depot) through the
present, that reveal, refer, or relate to any emotion,
feeling, or mental state of Plaintiff, as well as communications by or from Plaintiff that reveal, refer, or
relate to events that could reasonably be expected to
produce a significant emotion, feeling, or mental
state; (2) Third-party communications to Plaintiff
that place her own communications in context; . . .
(4) Any pictures of Plaintiff taken during the relevant time period and posted on Plaintiff’s profile or
tagged or otherwise linked to her profile.103
The court found such requests to be vague, overbroad, not
“reasonably particular,” and suggestive of a “fishing expedition.”104
In Giacchetto (the facts of which were articulated in the previous section), the court declined to permit general access to the
plaintiff’s private social media accounts.105 Instead, the court limited the scope of permissible discovery, instructing the plaintiff
to produce “any specific references to the emotional distress she
claims she suffered or treatment she received in connection with
the incidents underlying her Amended Complaint (e.g., references
to a diagnosable condition or visits to medical professionals).”106
The plaintiff was also required to produce any social network postings that referred to “an alternative potential stressor,” as the
plaintiff welcomed such discovery by seeking emotional distress
damages (which invites discovery of all potential causes for the alleged distress).107
103

Id. at 569 (citing Joint Stipulation at 2).
See id. at 571–72.
105
See Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112, 117
(E.D.N.Y. 2013).
106
Id. at 116.
107
See id.
104
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Other cases have articulated a limited, narrowly tailored scope
of discovery when physical damages are at issue. The plaintiff in
Scipione v. Advance Stores Co., claimed damages relating to an injury
to her knee during a purported slip-and-fall at Advance Auto Parts
Store.108 The court ultimately approved an agreement reached by
the parties regarding the production of the content of the plaintiff’s
Facebook account.109 The plaintiff was required to produce “copies of her Facebook content since [three years prior to the accident]
that refers to her knee or her alleged injury, and copies of all photos
of her on Facebook since [the date of the accident.]”110
In Davenport v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the
court addressed a plaintiff’s claim that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company failed to provide her with settlement
benefits stemming from a car accident in which the plaintiff was
permanently injured.111 The defendant sought production of “[a]ll
photographs posted, uploaded, or otherwise added to any social
networking sites or blogs . . . posted since the date of the accident
alleged in the Complaint [including] photographs posted by others
in which [the plaintiff] has been tagged or otherwise identified
therein.”112 The court found that, because the request asked the
plaintiff to produce all photographs that had been added to any social networking site since the date of the accident, including those
that were not even of the plaintiff, or taken by the plaintiff, the request was “overly broad on its face.”113 Therefore the court
granted the request in part, ordering the plaintiff to produce “all
photographs added to any [social networking site] since the date of

108

See Scipione v. Advance Stores Co., No. 8:12-cv-687-T-24AEP, 2013 WL 646405, at
*1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2013).
109
See id. at *1–2.
110
Id. at *1.
111
See Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:11-cv-632-J-12JBT, 2011
WL 7936671 (M.D. Fla. June 28, 2011) (“The Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks recovery of
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage benefits under stacking policies of automobile
insurance issued by State Farm which provides a total of three hundred thousand dollars
($300,000.00) in available uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage benefits.”).
112
See Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:11-cv-632-J-JBT, 2012 WL
555759, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2012).
113
Id. at *2.

2014]

"SHARING" WITH THE COURT

251

the subject accident that depict Plaintiff, regardless of who posted the
photograph.”114
Although the plaintiff argued that she should not have to produce photographs that were merely “tagged”115 of her, the court
was not persuaded. Citing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Simply Storage, the plaintiff asserted that such tagged photos
were “less likely to be relevant” than photos that she had posted
herself.116 “Nevertheless,” the court stated, “the potential relevancy of such photographs outweighs any burden of production or
privacy interest therein.”117
Courts that have chosen to only permit the production of narrowly tailored discovery requests frequently require that such tailoring provide for a specific, relevant time period (rather than calling for the producing party to sift through the entire contents of an
individual’s social media account). Such was the case in Levine v.
Culligan of Florida, Inc., where the court found the defendant’s request to be overly broad, in part, because it was not limited in
time.118 In the context of cases involving a particular accident,
courts may also limit production to social media content created on
or after the date of the accident.119
Limiting production to requests that are both narrowly tailored
and limited in time (if possible) provides what is seemingly the
most fluid and adaptable means for preventing “overbroad” dis114

Id. (emphasis added).
“‘Tagging’ is the process by which a third party posts a picture and links people in
the picture to their profiles so that the picture will appear in the profiles of the person
who ‘tagged’ the people in the picture, as well as on the profiles of the people who were
identified in the picture.” Id. at n.3 (citing EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270
F.R.D. 430, 436 n.3 (S.D. Ind. 2010)).
116
Id. at *2 (citing EEOC, 270 F.R.D. at 436).
117
Id.
118
See Levine v. Culligan of Florida, Inc., No. 50-2011-CA-010339-XXXXMB, 2013 WL
1100404, at *5 (Trial Order) (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 29, 2013) (“[W]hile Defendant’s second
request for ‘all other social networking sites’ is limited form [sic] the date of the incident
until present, Defendant’s initial request for Plaintiff’s Facebook profile is not limited in
time and therefore overly broad.”).
119
See, e.g., Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., No. 3:11-cv-81-RLY-WGH, 2013 WL 3366278,
at *3 (S.D. Ind. July 5, 2013) (“Since [Defendant] seeks information on the effects of
Plaintiff’s injuries, the court finds that only the material dated on or after the accident
would be relevant to their claim.”).
115
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covery requests. By requiring narrowly tailored discovery requests,
courts begin to omit some of the difficulties presented by full disclosure. First, such requests must necessarily have some relation to
the claims in question (as is also required for the “relevance” inquiry), making it far less likely that the requests turn into a “fishing
expedition.” Also, narrowly tailored requests allow the responding
party to have an initial framework of requests, providing the opportunity to negotiate or fine-tune the specifics of the discovery request in question (if the party wishes to contest them).
C. Provide Adversary With the Individual’s Username and Password
A number of common pleas courts have, upon the requisite
showing of relevance, required a party to provide its adversary with
the usernames and passwords for any private social media accounts
held by the complaining individual as a means of producing requested social media material.120 Meanwhile, some federal district
courts have found that such requests for an individual’s log-in information are “too broad and [lack] reasonable particularity under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b).”121 In Mazzarella v. Mount Airy #1, LLC, the
plaintiff objected to a discovery request seeking the plaintiff’s
username and password, citing privacy concerns.122 The court
granted the defendant’s motion to compel, stating “[t]he information requested . . . could lead to relevant information. Furthermore,
Plaintiff’s argument of an expectation of privacy regarding her use
of social media is displaced. Those who elect to use social media,
and place things on the internet for viewing, sharing and use with
others, waives an expectation of privacy.”123
120

See Brogan v. Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, L.L.P., No. 08-CV-6048, 2013 WL
1742689 (Trial Order) (Pa. Ct. C. P. Apr. 22, 2013) (“[A] few common pleas courts have
required plaintiffs to provide the defense with their Facebook usernames and passwords
based upon a threshold showing of relevance.”); see also Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823,
2011 WL 5632688 (Pa. Ct. C. P. Nov. 8, 2011) (Trial Order); Zimmerman v. Weis Mkts.,
Inc., No. 09-1535, 2011 WL 2065410 (Pa. Ct. C. P. May 19, 2011) (Trial Order);
McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285 (Pa. Ct.
C. P. Sept. 9, 2010) (Trial Order).
121
Id. (citations omitted).
122
See Browning, supra note 9, at 513–14 (quoting Mazzarella v. Mount Airy #1, LLC,
No. 1798 Civ. 2009, 2012 WL 6000678, at *1 (Pa. Ct. C. P. Nov. 7, 2012) (order granting
defendant’s motion to compel)).
123
Id.
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The court ruled similarly in Zimmerman v. Weis Markets, Inc.,
Largent v. Reed and Gallagher v. Urbanovich, requiring in each case
that a party provide their requesting adversary with log-in information for all social media accounts in order to facilitate review of the
accounts’ content. In all three cases, the court also directed the
individual account holders to “not take steps to delete or alter existing information and posts on [social media accounts.]”124 In Largent, the court reasoned, “[w]e agree with [the defendant] that information contained on [the plaintiff’s] Facebook profile is discoverable. It is relevant and not covered by any privilege, and the request is not unreasonable. We will thus allow [the defendant]
access to [the plaintiff’s] Facebook account to look for the necessary information.”125 In Gallagher, the court provided that access
to one’s Facebook account should be limited to a seven-day window.126 Gallagher is also distinguished from this line of cases because the requesting party was not the defendant; rather, the court
ordered the defendant to produce his Facebook username and
password to the plaintiff.127
In addition, the production of log-in information has not only
been limited to the requesting party. In a Connecticut family law
case, Gallion v. Gallion, Judge Kenneth Shluger ordered both parties
in a divorce to “exchange . . . their client’s Facebook and dating
website passwords.”128 Also, at least one court has specifically
stated that this means of production would suggest an unduly burdensome invasion of privacy. In Higgins v. Koch Development Corp.,
the court found that the defendant had taken “sufficient steps to
avoid unduly invading [the plaintiffs’] privacy” precisely because it

124

See Zimmerman, 2011 WL 2065410; see also Largent, 2011 WL 5632688 (“Plaintiff
shall not delete or otherwise erase any information on her Facebook account.”);
Gallagher v. Urbanovich, No. 2010-33418 (Pa. Ct. C. P. Feb. 27, 2012) (order granting
plaintiff’s motion to compel) (Judge William Carpenter ordered the defendant to “not
delete or otherwise erase any information on his Facebook account.”).
125
Largent, 2011 WL 5632688.
126
See Browning, supra note 9, at 513 (citing Gallagher, No. 2010-33418).
127
See id. at 512.
128
Id. (quoting Gallion v. Gallion, No. FA114116955S, 2011 WL 4953451, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011)).
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had refrained from requesting the plaintiffs’ Facebook passwords.129
Ultimately, ordering the production of an individual’s username and password presents the same issues as would exist if the
court were to simply order full production of that individual’s entire private social media account. Clearly, providing an adversary
with log-in information inherently grants the requesting party full
access to that individual’s account. However, granting requests for
log-in information may actually give the requesting party much fuller access to the account in question, as it omits the opportunity to
redact irrelevant or privileged information.
D. Require In Camera Review of the Individual’s Entire Facebook
Account
In some cases addressing discovery requests for private Facebook account communications, courts have found that “the appropriate course is to remand the matter for an in camera inspection of
the plaintiff’s Facebook records, to determine which of those
records, if any, are relevant.”130 In Richards v. Hertz Corp., although the plaintiffs had already been directed to provide the defendant with copies of a specific category of photos relating to the
claim in question, the court still required additional in camera review.131 The court noted that the plaintiffs’ Facebook profile would
likely contain content beyond photographs (“such as status reports, emails, and videos that are relevant to the extent of [the
plaintiff’s] alleged injuries”).132 Citing a need to balance the existence of such additional material with the “likely presence” of other private, yet irrelevant, material within the plaintiffs’ Facebook
129

Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., No. 3:11-cv-81-RLY-WGH, 2013 WL 3366278, at *2
(S.D. Ind. July 5, 2013).
130
Nieves v. 30 Ellwood Realty L.L.C., 966 N.Y.S.2d 808, 808–09 (2013); see also
Richards v. Hertz Corp, 953 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); Pereira v. City of
N.Y., 975 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 19, 2013); Loporcaro v. City of N.Y., 950
N.Y.S.2d 723, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 9, 2012) (“[P]laintiffs are directed to provide this
Court with copies of plaintiff’s education, employment, pharmacy, marital counseling
records and Facebook postings, including deleted material, in order that the Court may
perform an in camera inspection to assess the materiality and relevance of these
materials” (emphasis added)).
131
See Richards, 953 N.Y.S.2d at 656–57.
132
Id. at 656.
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account, the court called for an in camera inspection of all content
within the plaintiff’s Facebook account since the date of the accident at question in the claim.133
The court offered similar reasoning in Pereira v. City of New
York, noting that, “due to the likely presence of material of a private nature [within the plaintiff’s social media accounts] that is not
relevant to this action, this court shall conduct an in camera inspection of copies of all status reports, e-mails, photographs, and videos
posted on plaintiff’s media sites since the date of the subject accident, to determine which of those materials, if any, are relevant to
his alleged injuries.”134 In Nieves v. 30 Ellwood Realty LLC, the
court noted that if such in camera inspection proved too burdensome, the court reserved the discretion to “direct plaintiff to conduct an initial review of her own Facebook account, and limit the in
camera inspection to items whose discoverability is contested by
plaintiff.”135
In at least one case, a magistrate judge suggested that he could
create a Facebook account and become “friends” with the plaintiffs “for the sole purpose of reviewing photographs and related
comments in camera . . . [The magistrate judge] would [then]
promptly review and disseminate any relevant information to the
parties.”136 The court in this case made such a suggestion as a
means to expedite the discovery process.137
Several courts have disagreed with this approach, finding it to
be unnecessary,138 a waste of “time or resources,”139 or only per133

Id. at 656–57.
Pereira, 975 N.Y.S.2d at *2; see also Nieves, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 808 (“‘[S]ince it is
possible that not all Facebook communications are related to the events that gave rise to
plaintiff’s cause of action,’ the appropriate course is to remand the matter for an in
camera inspection.” (citations omitted)).
135
Nieves, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 809 (citations omitted).
136
Barnes v. CUS Nashville, L.L.C., No. 3:09-cv-00764, 2010 WL 2265668, at *1
(M.D. Tenn. June 3, 2010).
137
See id.
138
See Thompson v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01375-PMP-VCF, 2012 WL
2342928, at *4 (D. Nev. June 20, 2012) (“Because Plaintiff has not claimed that the
requested information is privileged or protected, the Court finds an in camera review of
Plaintiff’s social networking accounts unnecessary.”).
139
Fawcett v. Altieri, 960 N.Y.S.2d 592, 598 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013).
134

256

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:227

missible when other options have been exhausted.140 Specifically,
Fawcett states that “asking courts to review hundreds of transmissions ‘in camera’ should not be the all purpose solution to protect
the rights of litigants. Courts do not have the time or resources to
be the researchers for advocates seeking some tidbit of information
that may be relevant in a . . . claim.”141 The viewpoint in Fawcett
could be seen as the most prudent, as it appears to align most clearly with the ways in which discovery is typically handled when addressing issues outside of the realm of social media. As Nieves
points out, it only makes sense to utilize in camera review when
there is a specific, contested issue between parties. Otherwise, it
seems wholly unnecessary to uniquely require in camera review for
social media discovery requests when this burden does not necessarily exist for other types of discovery.
III. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE MEANS TO FACILITATE
DISCOVERY OF AN INDIVIDUAL’S PRIVATE SOCIAL MEDIA
ACCOUNT?
A. Order That the Individual Provide Adversary with a “Copy” of the
Individual’s Account Through the “Download Your Information”
Feature Available on Facebook
Intertwined with issues surrounding the acceptable depth of
social media discovery is the question of how to actually facilitate
the production of any social media documents. There has been
some discussion of utilizing the Download Your Information Expanded Archive mechanism on Facebook as a means of facilitating
production of an individual’s private account. This feature allows a
user to “preserve [the entirety of] their Facebook data in electronic
format,” so that it may be produced in a “pdf” format or in hard
copy.142 Timothy C. Quinn comments:
140

See Moore v. Miller, No. 10-651, 2013 WL 2456114, at *2 (D. Col. June 6, 2013) (“In
camera review should be employed only where no other remedy is adequate. Here, the
Court’s standard protective order will adequately address any privacy concerns the
parties may have.”).
141
Fawcett, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 597–98 (emphasis in original).
142
See Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., No. 3:11-cv-81-RLY-WGH, 2013 WL 3366278, at
*1–3 (S.D. Ind. July 5, 2013) (Defendants requested access to the plaintiffs’ Facebook
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A concern with this method is whether the requesting parties will actually receive all of the relevant
private content from the opponent in response to
their discovery requests. Any argument of this type
should fail. As with all discovery requests, litigants
have to rely on the other side to produce requested
documents or answers to interrogatories in good
faith. In any type of discovery request, the opposing
party could potentially withhold requested information. That is how discovery works. If the responding
party fails to respond properly to a discovery request, he or she could face sanctions or penalties of
perjury, because all responses must be “verified” by
the responding party under penalties of perjury.143
Another case pointed out a clear benefit of this means of production. Although having access to an adversary’s Facebook log-in
information would allow a requesting party to “simply [print]
screens” from the Facebook page in question, in In re White Tail
Oilfield Services, L.L.C., the requesting party argued that this
“would not capture deleted data,” therefore asking the court to
use the “‘download your information’ feature” (which keeps a
complete record of all Facebook activity, whether deleted or
not).144
B. Require That the Individual Sign a Release Permitting Facebook to
Provide the Court/Adversary with Account Information
Although a party may not personally subpoena information
from Facebook due to the SCA,145 a court may still require an individual to sign a release permitting Facebook to provide the court,
accounts using “Facebook’s ‘download your information “Expanded Archive”
mechanism’ to preserve their Facebook data in electronic format.” The court granted the
defendants’ motion (although limiting the production in time), finding that the
defendants both “made a prima facie showing that the materials sought will reasonably
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; and . . . [that the] privacy rights of parties
or non-parties would [not] be violated by disclosing the information.”).
143
Quinn, supra note 94, at 827.
144
In re White Tail Oilfield Servs., L.L.C., No. 11-0009, 2012 WL 4857777, at *3 (E.D.
La. Oct. 11, 2012).
145
See cases cited supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
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or his adversary, with the contents of his private Facebook account.146 So long as the account holder, as the “originator or an
addressee or intended recipient of [the relevant] communications,” provides lawful consent, Facebook may produce requested
account information to a litigating party.147 Browning notes that
“[a] properly drafted consent form should include the account
holder or user’s name, any user ID, group ID, or known screen
name, along with the person’s date of birth and address, including
email address. The consent should also include—much like a welldrafted discovery request—a detailed description of what is being
sought.”148 This approach was taken in Beswick v. North West Medical Center, Inc. and Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., both requiring the
plaintiff to provide the defendant with an executed consent form
(authorizing the production of their social media account records)
that could then be presented to Facebook or other social media
networks.149
C. Individual Provides Adversary with an Electronic Storage Device
with All Information from Individual’s Social Media Account
Thompson v. Autoliv ASP, Inc. uniquely called for the use of an
electronic storage device as a means of producing the content of an
individual’s social media accounts.150 The court directed the plaintiff to “upload onto an electronic storage device all information
from her Facebook and MySpace accounts, from [a certain date] to
the present.”151 In addition to providing the defendant’s counsel
with the electronic storage device, the court directed the plaintiff
146

See cases cited supra note 29 and accompanying text.
See Browning, supra note 6, at 475.
148
Id.
149
See Beswick v. N. W. Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 07-020592 CACE (03), 2011 WL 7005038
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 2011) (Trial Order) (“Plaintiff shall deliver to Counsel for
Defendants a properly executed consent and authorization as may be required by the
operators of Facebook, permitting the Defendants to gain access to Plaintiff’s Facebook
records.”); Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)
(“Plaintiff shall deliver to Counsel for Defendant . . . a properly executed consent and
authorization as may be required by the operators of Facebook and MySpace, permitting
said Defendant to gain access to Plaintiff’s Facebook and MySpace records, including any
records previously deleted or archived by said operators.”).
150
Thompson v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01375-PMP-VCF, 2012 WL 2342928,
at *5 (D. Nev. June 20, 2012).
151
Id. (emphasis added in original).
147
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to also provide the defendant with an “index of [all] redacted social
networking site communications.”152 Browning is a proponent of
this approach and advocates its use by the courts. He argues:
This approach is instructive and should be explored
by courts confronted with requests for a party’s social media passwords (or similar unlimited access to
all of a party’s social media content) for several reasons. First, it recognizes that the scope of discovery
into social media requires, as one court eloquently
put it, “the application of basic discovery principles
in a novel context,” with “the challenge [being] to
define appropriately broad limits . . . on the discoverability of social communications.” It also reflects
an understanding of the fact that the sufficiency of
discovery responses, like beauty, is often in the eye
of the beholder, and the lines of demarcation may be
difficult for judges to navigate.153
The “index” required by the court in Thompson, similar to a
conventional privilege log, might also help to ease the strain on
judicial resources ordinarily present by in camera review.154
D. Appoint a Special E-Discovery Master to Oversee Electronic
Discovery
Finally, some courts have chosen to utilize an outside, neutral
specialist to contend with electronic discovery requests.155 In Equal
152

Id.
Browning, supra note 9, at 535–36 (citations omitted).
154
Id. (“Preparation of a ‘social media index,’ somewhat akin to a privilege log,
minimizes the burden that in camera review can represent to already limited judicial
resources.”).
155
See, e.g., Bro-Tech Corp. v. Thermax, Inc., No. 05-CV-2330, 2008 WL 5210346, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2008) (“Plaintiffs were permitted to conduct comprehensive
electronic searches of certain data storage devices of the Defendants” after the court
ordered the process to be “overseen and directed by [a] special electronic discovery
master (‘e-discovery master’), and conducted in accordance with protocols imposed by
the e-discovery master or reached by party stipulation—and approved by the Court in
either event”); see also EEOC v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co. of Ga., No. 11-cv-02560MSK-MEH, 2012 WL 5430974, at *2 (D. Col. Nov. 7, 2012); Perrone v. Rose City HMA,
L.L.C., No. CI-11-14933, 2013 WL 4011622, at *1 (Trial Order) (Pa. Ct. C. P. May 3,
2013).
153
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Employment Opportunity Commission v. Original Honeybaked Ham
Co. of Georgia, Judge Hegarty curbed attempts at unfettered access
to a party’s private Facebook account instructing a “special master
[to] compile the text messages and postings on Facebook and other
pages, determine what was and was not relevant, and then give
plaintiffs an opportunity to object before the content was produced.”156 The approach has become an increasingly popular way
for courts to handle social media discovery disputes.157 This may
include requiring the parties themselves to hire such a “special
master,” as the court did in Perrone v. Rose City HMA, L.L.C., a
Pennsylvania premises liability case.158 In Perrone, the judge ordered that the parties were to:
Hire a “neutral forensic computer expert” to review the plaintiffs’ privacy-restricted Facebook account for a seventeen-day period relevant to the
person injury claims in the case . . . [The judge] directed that the neutral expert be given plaintiff’s user names and password information in order to
access the account, download the account contents
to a hard drive, and identify and isolate “all photographs of snow and references to snow in any emails
and any photographs of the Plaintiff . . . engaged in
any physical activity.” Copies of the files would
then be provided to counsel, and the costs of the
neutral expert would be assessed against the defendants.159
This approach may offer one means of curbing some of the issues that arise when it seems that the entirety of an individual’s
Facebook account would be relevant. Furthermore, using a special
“e-discovery master” offers some of the same inherent benefits of
in camera review, without placing the burden on the court itself.
Still, this forces us to ask why these types of requests would necessarily require this type of in-depth, neutral analysis, when such

156
157
158
159

See Browning, supra note 9, at 516.
See id. at n.54.
Perrone, 2013 WL 4011622, at *1.
Browning, supra note 9, at n.54 (citations omitted).
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precautions are not required to be taken with other non-social media discovery requests.
IV. RESOLUTION: DO NOT TREAT SOCIAL MEDIA
DISCOVERY ANY DIFFERENTLY THAN ANY OTHER
DISCOVERY REQUESTS
A. Social Media Discovery Requests Should Not Uniquely Require a
Different Means of Facilitation, Production, or Judicial Assistance
The conflicts of law articulated throughout this note must lead
us to question what in fact the appropriate depth of social media
discovery is, and how to facilitate such discovery. The fact that
courts have been unable to conclusively agree on a method for approaching social media discovery requests suggests that such requests are often viewed as unique. However, “[t]o the extent social-media discovery presents challenges the existing discovery system cannot adequately deal with,” those challenges are not in fact
unique to social media requests specifically.160 It therefore appears
that the best “solution” for appropriately handling social media
discovery requests is actually to treat these requests no differently
than any other types of discovery.
In the social media context, requesting parties appear to have
an increased concern that their adversaries will fail to provide them
with all relevant and responsive information. However, this concern is misplaced. There is no reason to suggest that counsel has
any less of an obligation to provide adversaries with documents
that are responsive to a well-tailored discovery request simply because the documents requested include digital communications
potentially shielded by a social networking site’s privacy settings.
The court highlighted this sentiment in Simply Storage, stating that
“lawyers are frequently called upon to make judgment calls—in
good faith and consistent with their obligations as officers of the
court—about what information is responsive to another party’s
discovery requests.”161 The court noted that, should parties believe
160

Steven S. Gensler, Special Rules for Social Media Discovery?, 65 ARK. L. REV. 7, 11
(2012).
161
EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 436 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
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that the other side failed to produce a full set of discovery documents, there are options available and procedures already set in
place to provide for dealing with such shortcomings.162 Most notably, “a refusal by a plaintiff to produce relevant and discoverable
content could be grounds for imposing sanctions.”163 Quinn explains:
[A]n interested party cannot be the “final arbiter”
of relevance. But counsel for the producing party is
the judge of relevance in the first interest. Discovery
in our adversarial system is based on a good faith response to demands for production by an attorney
constrained by the Federal Rules and by ethical obligations. Where the parties disagree as to the contours of relevance in connection with particular discovery demands, they present their dispute to the
court . . . When a party can demonstrate that an adversary may be wrongfully withholding relevant information, it can seek relief . . . .164
Ultimately, there is no reason that parties should require any
particular judicial assistance in order to decide which information
contained within an individual’s Facebook account is responsive to
a discovery request.165 This means, first and foremost, that a court
162

See Quinn, supra note 94, at 827.
Id. (citing Mackelprang v. Fid. Nat’l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00788JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *8 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007))
164
Id. at 828 (citing Rozell v. Ross-Holst, No. 05 Civ. 2936(JGK) (JCF), 2006 WL
163143, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006)).
165
See Offenback v. L.M. Bowman, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1789, 2011 WL 2491371, n.3
(M.D. Pa. June 22, 2011). (“[W]e express some confusion about why the parties required
the Court’s assistance in deciding what information within Plaintiff’s Facebook account is
responsive to Defendants’ discovery requests and therefore properly discoverable.
Although Defendants have taken a broad view of the potential relevance of Plaintiff’s
Facebook account, Plaintiffs do not appear to have argued that the information in the
bulleted paragraphs above should be protected from disclosure in this lawsuit. It is thus
unclear why the Court was called upon to conduct an initial review of Plaintiff’s entire
Facebook account to determine whether it contained potentially responsive, nonprivileged information that should be produced as part of discovery in this case. Given
that the Plaintiff is the party with the greatest familiarity with his own Facebook account,
we submit that it would have been appropriate and substantially more efficient for
Plaintiff to have conducted this initial review and then, if he deemed it warranted, to
object to disclosure of some or all of the potentially responsive information included in his
163
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should not be asked to intervene to conduct an initial review of an
individual’s entire Facebook account (private or otherwise).166 Requesting this type of judicial intervention is, essentially, requesting
that the court do the job of the counsel for the responding party.
This also suggests that counsel for the requesting party has some
misplaced belief that the other party is somehow less capable of
adequately responding to a discovery request when private social
media is involved.
In Offenback, the court expressed “some confusion” about why
the parties required the court’s assistance at all.167 Magistrate
Judge Martin C. Carlson stated, “[g]iven that the Plaintiff is the
party with the greatest familiarity with his own Facebook account,
we submit that it would have been appropriate and substantially
more efficient for Plaintiff to have conducted this initial review and
then, if he deemed it warranted, to object to disclosure of some or
all of the potentially responsive information included in his account.”168
B. Discovery Requests Should Be Drafted in a Way to Be Wholly
Inclusive of All Social Media, Such That the Means of
Facilitation/Production Becomes Irrelevant
In order to best ensure that counsel is able to produce relevant,
potentially admissible documents, discovery requests must merely
be drafted in a way that is both inclusive of all forms of social media
account. The Court recognizes that the scope of discovery into social media sites
‘requires the application of basic discovery principles in a novel context,’ and that the
challenge is to ‘define appropriately broad limits . . . on the discovery ability of social
communications.’ However, in this case it appears that Defendants backed away from
their initial position that they should be entitled to a general release of all information and
data from Plaintiff’s social networking sites, and that instead of engaging in a broad
fishing expedition, were attempting to discover potentially relevant information such as
that described in their May 2, 2011, letter to the Court. If Defendants had, in fact,
narrowed their discovery requests in this fashion, we believe it would have been both
possible and proper for Plaintiff to have undertaken the initial review of his Facebook
account to determine whether it contained potentially relevant and responsive
information, and thereafter to solicit the Court’s assistance if a dispute remained as to
whether he should be required to produce the information identified.” (citations
omitted)).
166
See id.
167
See id.
168
Id.
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and also specifies a narrowly tailored area of requested content. Essentially, this is treating social media discovery requests in a way
that is no different than other discovery requests. Most notably,
this will still yield the same, if not better, results. This resonated
with the Offenback court, which stated that, if the defendants had
narrowed their discovery request, rather than “engaging in a broad
fishing expedition,”
it would have been both possible and proper for
Plaintiff to have undertaken the initial review of his
Facebook account to determine whether it contained potentially relevant and responsive information, and thereafter to solicit the Court’s assistance
[only] if a dispute remained as to whether he should
be required to produce the information identified.169
This approach requires only that the rules that govern the discovery of information held in hard copy similarly apply to the content of electronic communications from social media sites.170 The
court prescribed this in Howell, stating:
Defendants are free to serve interrogatories and
document requests that seek information from the
accounts that is relevant to the claims and defenses
in this lawsuit. Plaintiff’s counsel can then access
the private sections of Howell’s social media accounts and provide the information and documents
responsive to the discovery requests.171
Accordingly, all discovery requests that seek to collect evidence
from social media sites should be specified to closely relate to the
litigation at hand.172
In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center is an example of one case
in which the court treated a social media discovery request no dif169

Id.
See, e.g., Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-1014, 2012 WL 5265170, at *1
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 1, 2012) (“The same rules that govern the discovery of information in
hard copy documents apply to electronic files.”).
171
Id.
172
See Gregory, supra note 1, at 451 (“A discovery request to garner evidence from
social media sources should, therefore, be particularized as much as possible to the claim
or defense at issue in order to pass judicial scrutiny.”).
170
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ferently than any other type of discovery request.173 The defendant
requested the production of all electronic communications during a
certain time period, “including social media accounts, emails, text
messages, and instant messages,” that may have related to the
plaintiff’s domicile on the date of the crash in question.174 The
court’s ruling stated only that the “[p]laintiff shall produce responsive documents as ordered herein within 30 days of the entry
date of this decision.”175 This request was narrowly tailored such
that judicial intervention was not required to either determine the
relevancy of potential documents, or to determine the means of
production.
Additionally, if courts apply the same discovery standards to
social media discovery requests as they do to requests for all other
types of documents, there will no longer be a need for courts to
conduct a separate “relevance” inquiry. A court will not need to
determine whether the requesting party has provided evidence of
“relevant” information on an individual’s public Facebook page,
such that a court may permit discovery of that individual’s private
Facebook account. The relevance inquiry176 appears only necessary
in contexts where a defendant is, for example, requesting the entire
(or nearly entire) contents of a plaintiff’s private Facebook or social
media account. However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure177
do not actually “require a party prove the existence of relevant material before requesting it.”178 Therefore, as noted in Giacchetto,
this relevance inquiry has the danger of “improperly shield[ing]
from discovery”179 information that should otherwise be discoverable. If we require relevance to be proved by showing that information relating to the claims in question exists on some part of the
public profile of the party in question, we may inadvertently protect items from discovery merely because the social media account
has a well-protected public profile. However, a proper, narrowly
173

See In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., N.Y. on Feb. 12, 2009, Nos. 09-MD-2085,
09-CV-961 S, 2011 WL 6370189, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011).
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Id. at *5.
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See supra notes 30–34.
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178
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tailored social media discovery request (that would be handled by
the court no differently than any other request), would, by default,
skip such an inquiry, leading instead directly to the production of
all pertinent and discoverable content.
Finally, this approach makes many considerations about how to
determine the depth of discovery and the means of discovery production moot. First, an individual would never be required to provide a requesting party with his username and password180 because
the burden would be placed upon the responding individual instead
to simply produce only the responsive material in whatever form is
reasonable. Because the entire content of an individual’s private
Facebook account would not likely be part of a narrowly tailored
discovery request, it would be unnecessarily broad to provide an
adversary with account log-in information. Similarly, in camera review181 would become applicable only in contexts in which the parties were unable to agree about what content should be discoverable. Although the Download Your Information182 feature available
on Facebook may prove useful when producing documents, it
would not necessarily be required. Because this feature provides
the account holder with an electronic copy (“pdf”) of everything
that is contained in an account, it could prove to be a useful way for
a responding party to conduct an initial review of the content of his
account. Then, whichever content is deemed responsive could actually be taken from this pdf, with redactions as applicable. This
same reasoning would also hold true for the use of special ediscovery masters.183 While such “masters” may be of use in resolving actual disputes about the discoverable content of social media, if all discovery requests are narrowly tailored to actually relate
to the litigation and claims at hand, there should be no need to utilize these “masters” to conduct any type of initial review to assist
in determining which content is responsive.
The court would also not need to, in ordinary circumstances,
direct an individual to sign a release permitting Facebook to pro-
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vide the court or his adversary with account content.184 With the
approach described herein as the new standard, a responding party
would have the burden to review all social media accounts (whether they are private or not) for any potentially responsive content.
Because an individual would already have access to his own account information, there would be no reason to request account
content from Facebook. A release would, therefore, only be required if a responding party refused to comply with a valid discovery request or if there were reason to believe that the account holder had deleted potentially responsive information that could only
be retrieved by Facebook. Finally, an electronic storage device185
could potentially be a useful means of production but should not by
any means be the sole means of production for social media discovery requests. An electronic storage device could be helpful if the
responsive material is so voluminous that it would not be reasonable to turn over discovery in hard copy (or by any other requested
means); however, there would be no reason to insist on this method, given that the entirety of an individual’s account would not
need to somehow be transferred to an adversarial party (or to the
court).
Furthermore, there is also no reason to draft new or unique social media discovery rules, either governing the depth of discovery
or the means of document production. It is clear that social media
discovery requests are able to fit within the current framework of
discovery rules;186 therefore, “any effort to draft special rules for
social-media discovery would probably ask more of the current
rulemaking process than it can deliver.”187 In light of the existence
of exponentially increasing technology, any social media discovery
rules created today would likely seem entirely antiquated even a
decade from now.188 Therefore, the answer should not just be to
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stick with the status quo, but rather to truly embrace the procedures that have already worked for the judicial system for so many
years. It seems likely that many of the more troubling cases that
permitted extremely broad discovery (and the full production of
private social media accounts) would have been better resolved had
these courts seen the “documentation” in question for what it really was—content that, legally speaking, presented no different challenges than giant stacks of papers from a room full of filing cabinets.189 Although one can infer that the courts of Beswick or Bass
reached the conclusions that they did in part due to a lack of familiarity with social media or a general sentiment that new media
should require new rules, any of these arguably old-fashioned ideas
are misplaced. Ultimately, so long as courts work within the current framework of discovery rules, the judicial system would not
only benefit by proceeding with one, unified approach to social media discovery requests, but it would also allow litigating parties to
have a fuller picture of what to expect from courts and adversaries
regarding the discovery of private social media accounts.

some new mode of communication that I cannot now fathom and will likely never learn to
use.”).
189
See supra note 55.

